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ABSTRACT
The main objective of this research article is to explore hypothesis
about the integration of the banking systems in European Union
(EU). Increasing the European Union member states degree of
convergence and integration is one of the major challenges faced
by the European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). The
empirical analysis is based on the non-linear time-varying coeffi-
cients factor model designed by Phillips and Sul for the sample
period 2007–2017. Our results indicate the rejection of the con-
vergence hypothesis for EU banking systems. Additionally, our
empirical findings reveal that there are significant differences in
how European banks assess the non-financial sector and the
households sector. During the period 2011–2013, which is a
period coinciding with the most severe episodes of the sovereign
debt crisis, the dispersion between trajectories increases, involving
a segmentation of interest rates, and this leads to the conclusion
that the integration of EU banking systems has been negatively
influenced by the sovereign debt crisis. The results of the empir-
ical study also suggested that for most clusters, the convergence
speed is relative, which does not lead to an absolute integration
in the long run.
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This research paper aims to investigate convergence hypothesis about the integration
of the banking systems in European Union (EU) Member States. The creation of the
European Union (EU) and the Economic and Monetary Union represents a perpetual
economic and political challenge. This is determined by the high degree of heterogen-
eity that characterizes EU Member States. Thus, despite the fact that the stage of
development of the Member States was initially similar, the enlargement of the EU to
Central and Eastern Europe, and the accession of the former socialist countries, has
considerably reduced the level of economic homogeneity.
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Against this background, the main challenge, unanimously accepted in the EU
treaties, is to increase the Member States degree of convergence and integration.
Financial integration plays a key role in the integration process. Eyraud, Singh, and
Sutton (2017) define financial integration as the process through which financial mar-
kets in two or more countries become more interconnected. This process can be
determined by several factors: cross-border financial flows, foreign capital, unified
market structures, and so on, considering that integration is signalled by the price
convergence of assets with the same characteristics (law of one price). This is to say
that there can only be perfect integration if a similar asset has the same price across
different markets.
Financial integration is important because financial markets are the main channel
for optimal allocation of resources. Moreover, a stable and efficient financial system
can accelerate the process of narrowing the development gaps between Member
States. Economic literature discusses the benefits of financial integration exhaustively.
The most important benefits of financial integration are the following: acceleration of
economic growth; reducing vulnerability to crises; increasing liquidity and capitaliza-
tion; improving financial stability; risk diversification; speeding up consumption;
increased foreign direct investment; the strengthening of financial discipline.
However, Agenor (2003) also lists some costs that financial integration may induce:
loss of macroeconomic stability; inefficient allocation of capital; the volatility of cap-
ital flows and an increase in the degree of spillovers. Also, a high level of financial
integration can be a determining factor in banking crises. Yet, in our view, the costs
of financial integration can be diminished, even eliminated, through an adequate
regulatory and supervisory framework.
Considering the importance of integration and economic convergence, and par-
ticularly that of financial integration and convergence, the main objective of the pre-
sent paper is to analyse the degree of financial integration in the EU. In this regard,
taking into account data availability, we analyse the integration of banking systems in
24 Member States over the period 2007–2017. The analysis of the integration of bank-
ing systems is carried out from the perspective of the law of one price, using as a
benchmark the interest rates applied by credit institutions to loans granted and to
attracted deposits. We study the integration of banking systems using the model pro-
posed by Phillips and Sul (2007).
Our secondary goals are multiple. First of all, we aim at identifying how the degree
of integration has evolved over time. Second, we investigate the manner in which the
global financial crisis and the sovereign debt crisis have influenced the dynamics of
integration from a financial stability point of view. Thirdly, we look at the differences
between developed countries and emerging countries.
In general, the number of research studies investigating the integration of bank-
ing systems using interest rates as a benchmark is limited. That is why, in our opin-
ion, our paper complements the literature with some new insights. From our best
knowledge, the most representative studies in this respect, which are also the closest
to our own objectives and the methodology adopted in the present chapter are:
Sørensen and Werner (2006); De Guevara, Maudos, and Perez (2007); Oplotnik,
Vojinovic, and Acharya (2011); Rughoo and Sarantis (2012); Rughoo and Sarantis
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(2014); Arnold and van Ewijk (2014); Paries, Moccero, Krylova, and Marchini
(2014). A significant number of empirical studies impose a strict limited sample
based only on emerging financial systems in Europe, i.e.: Kenourgios and Samitas
(2011), Guesmi and Nguyen (2014), Horvath and Petrovski (2013), Caporale and
Spagnolo (2012), Horvath and Huizinga (2015), or on the contrary only on devel-
oped financial systems in Europe, such as: Lee and Mercurelli (2014), Pozzi and
Wolswijk (2012), Berben and Jansen (2009), Worthington and Higgs (2010), De
Guevara et al. (2007).
In our opinion, the empirical analysis carried out in the present paper brings some
important contributions to the literature. First of all, as far as we know, there has
been no similar research to date based on such a large sample. Rughoo and Sarantis
(2012) and Rughoo and Sarantis (2014) used a similar methodology to assess financial
convergence for the first 15 integrated European countries. Arnold and van Ewijk
(2014) investigated the impact of sovereign risk and credit risk on the convergence of
interest rates in the retail banking sector in the euro area and suggested that the level
of convergence r was negatively affected by the global financial crisis. Second, by ana-
lysing the integration of banking systems in terms of interest rates, we provide an
exhaustive framework for decision-makers, especially considering that this area has
not been sufficiently researched in the literature. Third, we use a methodology that
allows us to identify the convergence speed and to classify selected countries into
convergence clusters.
In the literature, there are various other studies that have analyzed the integration
of banking systems in the European Union, based on different criteria. For example,
among others, Kılınç, Seven, and Yetkiner (2017) investigated the integration of EU
banking systems, having as criteria financial development and liquidity; Matousek,
Rughoo, Sarantis, and Assaf (2015); Weill (2009); Casu and Girardone (2010) ana-
lyzed the integration of banking systems in the European Union with reference to the
efficiency of commercial banks; Evans, Hasan, and Lozano-Vivas (2008) analyzed the
influence of regulations on the level of integration of EU banking systems; Perez,
Fumas, and Salas (2005) investigated the integration of banking systems considering
the cross-border financial flows and the activity of foreign-owned banks.
In the light of the above considerations, our research hypotheses can be delimited
as follows:
H1: In the EU Member States, the degree of financial integration has increased.
H2: The financial and macroeconomic instability generated by the global financial crisis
and the sovereign debt crisis have influenced the degree of financial integration.
Integration and economic convergence are the most important pillars of support
for European Union. Is there a common pattern for the integration of European
Union banking systems? Are there disparities within homogeneous regions such as
the euro area and the other member states of the European Union included in the
sample? Is there a large heterogeneity within EU member states? How severe are the
differences between the old and new EU member states for the integration of
European Union banking systems? The aim of this article is to find answers to all of
these questions.
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2. Research methodology and data collection
2.1. Methodology for testing convergence
In order to study the integration of banking systems in the EU Member States, we
use the model proposed by Phillips and Sul (2007) which tests the convergence
hypothesis for the data series included in the sample. In addition, if convergence
hypothesis is rejected for the whole sample, the model allows clustering selected data
series into convergence clusters.
The methodology proposed by Phillips and Sul (2007) uses a nonlinear model that
includes a component that varies over time. The model also allows us to observe the
dynamics over time and long-term behaviour. The econometric method developed by
Phillips and Sul (2007) is an innovative regression based convergence test.
Bartkowska and Riedl (2012) suggested that the model designed by Phillips and Sul
(2007) enables to detect convergence even in case of transitional divergence, where
other methods such as stationarity tests fail, such as Hobijn and Franses
(2000) framework.
Assuming we have a panel data sample for the variable Xit, where i ¼ 1; :::; N
and t ¼ 1; :::; T, where N is the number of units included in the sample, and T is
the period for which data is available. A simple linear pattern can be expressed as fol-
lows:
Xit ¼ diltþeit (1)
where lt is a common function with a trend that reveals the state of equilibrium that
can follow anon stationary stochastic process or a stationary process; di are specific
factors that measure the distance between the common trend lt and Xit; eit are idio-
syncratic components. Phillips and Sul (2007) reformulate Equation (1), allowing the
variation over time of specific factors, as follows:
Xit ¼ ditlt (2)
where dit absorbs eit: Moreover, Phillips and Sul (2007) model the specific factors in
a semi-parametric function, as follows:
dit ¼ di þ rinitLðtÞ1ta (3)
where di has a fixed value, nit is independently and identically distributed in the range
(0.1) for iand poorly dependent in time; L(t) is a function that varies (like log (tþ 1))
for which LðtÞ ! 1 liket ! 1). This wording certifies that dit converges to di for all
a 0 and consequently becomes the null convergence hypothesis. However, even if
the null hypothesis is valid and di ¼ dj for i 6¼ j, the model allows convergence for
different periods in which dit 6¼djt: Thus, the model includes the possibility of hetero-
geneity over time and even divergence in the sample. As Phillips and Sul (2007) sug-
gest, a high degree of heterogeneity can be introduced into the model, in the
situation where the speed of convergence and the function L(t) are specific to each
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unit in the sample. To have rigorous asymptotes for regression, certain conditions
must be imposed for idiosyncratic parameters ri and for the random variable nit:
The null hypothesis of convergence can be expressed as follows:
H0:dit ¼ d and a0
The alternative hypothesis is given by:
H1 : fdit¼ d for all I with a < 0g and fdit 6¼ d for some i with a  0 or a< 0g:
The alternative hypothesis assumes the sample’s divergence, but allows the forma-
tion of convergence groups. Identification and estimation dit it is not possible without
imposing hypotheses supplementing the dynamic model. In this respect, Phillips and












Parameter hit captures dit in relation to the panel average at the time t and
describes the evolution of the trajectory for the country i as compared to the average
of the sample data. Consequently, hit measures the distance of the country i from
equilibrium state, lt: If dit is convergent to d, the relative trajectory a hit is conver-




ðhit1Þ2!0 as t ! 1 (5)
where Ht measures the distance of the panel from the common limit. In the hypoth-
esis of convergence, Ht!0 as t ! 1: If the convergence hypothesis is rejected, the
distance remains positive and t tends to infinity. In this case, Phillips and Sul (2007)
suggest several possibilities: Ht may converge to a constant other than zero, it may
converge to a value greater than zero, but not convergent, or it may be divergent. In
the case of cluster convergence, Ht is convergent to a positive constant term.
Regression log t to test the convergence hypothesis for the whole sample, based
on asymmetric convergence in Equation (5), involves estimating the following regres-





 2 log L tð Þ ¼ âþb̂ log tþ l̂t (6)
for t ¼ rT½ ; rT½ þ1; :::; T where r > 0;L tð Þ¼ log tþ 1ð Þ and b̂¼ 2â, where â is the
estimated coefficient for a into the H0:
Phillips and Sul (2007) suggest estimating regression at a certain point t ¼ rT½  and
r > 0: Based on their own simulations, Phillips and Sul (2007) suggest that r ¼ 0:30,
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in situations where T is reduced or moderate (e.g., T  50) and r ¼ 0:20, in situa-
tions where T is high (for example, T  100). Considering that for the data series
used in our estimates T  100, we will use r ¼ 0:20:
The null hypothesis of convergence is rejected in the case tb< 1:65: Rejection of
the null hypothesis does not imply the absence of convergence for different sub-
groups of panel countries. Consequently, Phillips and Sul (2007) propose a cluster-
ing algorithm that allows the classification of countries in the sample into
convergence clusters. The procedure is flexible and the results imply several possi-
bilities, i.e.: sample countries convergence, sample countries divergence, conver-
gence clubs and divergent countries.
The clustering algorithm proposed by Phillips and Sul (2007) to delimit panel units
in convergence clubs based on regression log t comprises four main steps:
1. Sorting data based on the last observation. All units N of the panel are ordered
according to the last observation.
2. Formation of the main group. Selecting units in the panel with the highest values
k to form the convergence club Ck for 2  k<N: Regression logt is subsequently
estimated and t-statistical, tb kð Þ ¼ tb Ckð Þ, is calculated for this club. The main
convergence club is chosen by maximizing tb kð Þ for the case in which min
tb kð Þ> 1:65: If condition mintb kð Þ> 1:65 is not met for k ¼ 2, then the mem-
bers of the Ck can be excluded from the initial subcluster and new subclusters
C2J¼ f2, … , jg are formed for 3  j  N: The step can be repeated
until tb jð Þ ¼ tbðC2jÞ:
3. Selection of units for inclusion in the convergence club. After the formation of the
main convergence group, each unit is added separately to it and the regression
logt is estimated. Inclusion of a new unit in the main group is accomplished if
tb> c, where c is the critical value (c  0). Once the subgroup composition is
established, a regression logt for the whole group occurs. If tb> 1:65, the con-
struction is complete. Otherwise, we will need to increase critical value c and
repeat the procedure.
4. Stopping rule. A second group is formed for all units outside the first conver-
gence group. Regression logt is estimated for all units and if the convergence
hypothesis is accepted for this group, a second convergence group is formed. If
the units in this group do not tend to a common point, then steps 1, 2 and 3 are
repeated. If no groups are formed, then these units are divergent.
The value of the coefficient b̂ provides important information regarding the speed
of convergence. Thus, high coefficient values indicate a significant convergence
rate. At the same time, the value of the coefficient b̂ allows us to distinguish between
different degrees of convergence. More specifically, if 0 b̂< 2, we will obtain the
convergence rate (relative convergence), while b̂ 2 indicates convergence in level -
absolute convergence.
Convergence is a long-term goal. Consequently, Phillips and Sul (2007) recom-
mend using the Hodrick-Prescott filter to extract the trend component of the data
series. Consequently, for our own estimates, we have set the value of the smoothing
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parameter to 14.400, a value accepted in the empirical literature. The empirical esti-
mations have been obtain by using the GAUSS 10 econometric software.
2.2. Data description
The European Union (EU) includes 28 Member States. In our sample we have
included 24 EU countries: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Denmark,
Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, The Netherlands, Poland,
Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain and Sweden. To determine the integra-
tion of banking systems in the 24 states, we have used data series for lending interest
rates and for deposit interest rates over the period 2007–2017. We have limited our
sample to 24 EU Member States for reasons related to data availability. For Cyprus
and Malta, data were only available from 2008 (because no data were available prior
to 2008) and for Croatia since 2011. As for the UK, we have not identified series of
data similar to those included in our estimates. We also used the following syn-
tagmas:” the hard core of the euro area” (Austria, Germany, Netherlands, Belgium,
Luxembourg, France) and” the periphery of the euro area” which includes the GIIPS
countries, ie: Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain. The hard core of the euro
area represents a cluster of the countries with low interest rate disparities, while some
Central and Eastern European countries form cluster characterized by high interest
rates. The sample period reflects both the effects of the global financial crisis and the
effects of the sovereign debt crisis. For the non-financial sector, we have included the
following series of data in the estimations: the total interest rate on time deposits and
the total interest rate on loans granted. For households, we have included the follow-
ing series of estimates: the total interest rate on time deposits, the total interest rate
on real estate loans and the total interest rate on consumer credit. All series refer to
data denominated in national currencies. Interest rates on attracted deposits and on
loans granted were extracted from the ECB’s database and from the official databases
of each central banking for the sample countries.
Table 1 provides a complete and detailed framework for the data included in our
estimates. A synthetic analysis of the data in this table shows some relevant issues.
The main observation is related to the significant differences, both between the aver-
age values and between the volatility of the interest rates in the 24 countries included
in the sample. However, it should be noted that disparities are more pronounced in
the case of the average values for the active interest rate. Thus, in the case of passive
interest rates, the average values are more homogeneous. Regarding the average val-
ues, intuitively, we can see that the interest rates in the old EU states are lower com-
pared to the new EU states. More specifically, for example, the highest average
interest rates applied by credit institutions for the non-financial sector are found in
Romania, Bulgaria, Hungary, Greece and Poland, while the lowest values are in
Finland, Luxembourg, Austria, Sweden and France. The inclusion of Greece in the
group of Central and Eastern European countries can be explained by the sovereign
crisis in the country. In Romania, the situation seems to be a special one. Maximum
interest rates reach about 19%, almost four times higher than in the Czech Republic,
for example. High values at the top of the range can also be seen in the case of
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Hungary, 12.67%, and Bulgaria, 11.58%. The lowest values in the lower part of the
range can be seen in Luxembourg, Sweden and Austria. In general, the previous
observations are also valid for the interest rate on mortgages granted to households
for housing acquisition. The highest average values can be observed in Hungary,
Bulgaria, Romania, Poland and, surprisingly, the Netherlands. On the contrary, low
values can be observed in Finland, Estonia, Luxembourg, Portugal and Spain. In this
case, too, extreme values at the upper limit of the range can also be identified in
Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, Poland and Slovenia. For the other countries in the
sample, the maximum values do not exceed about 6%. The highest interest rates can
be seen in consumer credit to households. In this case, the highest average values are
found in Central and Eastern European countries, i.e. Hungary, Romania, the Czech
Republic, Poland and Bulgaria. The lowest average values are found in Luxembourg,
Finland, Austria, the Netherlands and Belgium.
In the case of interest rates on time deposits attracted from both the non-financial
sector and the households, the degree of heterogeneity is lower. The highest average
interest rates on deposits attracted from the non-financial sector are in Romania,
Hungary, Bulgaria and Poland. Contrariwise, lower values can be seen in
Luxembourg, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Lithuania. It is also noteworthy that,
with respect to the maximum values of the upper range, there is a high degree of
homogeneity of the values, with the exception of Romania and Hungary. Quite sur-
prisingly, we see higher values with respect to the lower limit of the range in France
and the Netherlands. From the analysis of interest rates on term deposits attracted
from households, a few interesting elements emerge. Thus, the highest average values
are in Romania, Bulgaria, Hungary and, surprisingly, in the Netherlands and France.
Similarly to interest rates on term deposits attracted from households, there is a high
homogeneity in the higher values of the upper range, with the exception of Romania,
Hungary and Bulgaria. In our opinion, the high values for term deposits from the
non-financial sector and households in Romania and Hungary can be explained by
the liquidity deficit on these markets. Surprisingly, peak values of the upper range are
observed in the Netherlands and France. This can be explained by the tendency of
these banking systems to protect the economies of the population, despite a lower
interest margin.
3. The integration of banking systems: empirical results and discussion
In what follows, we propose to look at how EU interest rate integration has evolved
over the past ten years and how financial instability has affected integration in 24 EU
Member States. Estimates will be made for both the sample of 24 countries and the
sample of the countries in the hard core of the euro area and those at the periphery
of the euro area.
Table 2 presents the results of the convergence algorithm for banking systems in
the 24 EU Member States, with the interest rate benchmark for loans to the non-
financial sector. The convergence hypothesis for the whole sample of countries is
rejected, considering that tb ¼ 19, 6686: Under these circumstances, the convergence
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algorithm proposed by Phillips and Sul (2007) tests the hypothesis of cluster
convergence.
The results obtained indicate the grouping of banking systems into three conver-
gence clusters, indicating three convergence points. Thus, the first convergence clus-
ter, which tends towards the highest equilibrium point (i.e. convergence of interest
rates to the highest average value in the sample), consists of Ireland, Portugal,
Poland, Greece, Bulgaria and Romania, and the speed convergence is low
(b̂ ¼ 0, 3469), which implies relative convergence only. The first cluster of conver-
gence includes the first euro zone countries that have faced the effects of the sover-
eign debt crisis. In fact, in the euro area, Greece, Ireland and Portugal, in that order,
were the first countries to receive financial assistance packages from international
lenders. Three countries from Central and Eastern Europe also belong to this group
of countries. The second convergence group consists of Austria, Belgium, Germany,
Estonia, Spain, France, Lithuania, Slovenia, Denmark, Latvia, Slovakia, Italy, Czech
Republic, Hungary and the Netherlands. Its structure is heterogeneous, including
banking systems on the periphery of the euro area, from the euro area hard core, as
well as emerging banking systems. The heterogeneity is also supported by the nega-
tive convergence rate (b̂ ¼ 0, 0193). The negative level of the convergence speed
expresses a rather short-term, circumstantial integration. The last convergence group
consists of Finland, Luxembourg and Sweden. Although the group structure is homo-
geneous, consisting in banking systems of developed countries, the convergence speed
is negative. Finally, it should be noted that the convergence hypothesis between clus-
ters is rejected.
Relevant issues arise from the analysis of interest rate trajectories on loans to the
non-financial sector (Figure 1). Note that the curve dynamics must be interpreted in
relation to the average of the sample, which is equal to 1. Consequently, the distance
from the average of the sample is an indication of the segmentation of interest rates.
The equilibrium points for the three convergence clusters are very clearly delineated.
The equilibrium point for the first convergence group is above the average of the
sample. Consequently, we can say that in Greece, Bulgaria, Romania, Poland, Ireland
and Portugal, interest rates on loans granted by credit institutions to the non-finan-
cial sector are higher than the average of the sample. Intuitively, Greece is the coun-
try where the rising dynamics of interest rates was the most pronounced. Thus, we
can observe that at the beginning of the analysis period, in 2009, the interest rate
Table 2. Cluster convergence algorithm for interest rate on loans to non-financial sector,
2007: 1–2017:10.
Cluster Countries tb b̂
Cluster1 Ireland, Portugal, Poland, Greece, Bulgaria, Romania 5.0951 0.3469
Cluster2 Austria, Belgium, Germany, Estonia, Spain, France,
Lithuania, Slovenia, Denmark, Latvia, Slovakia,
Italy, Czech Republic, Hungary, the Netherlands
0.2138 0.0193
Cluester3 Finland, Luxembourg, Sweden 0.2873 0,1450
Testing the hypothesis of convergence between clusters
Cluster 1 þ Cluster 2 443.918 0.5681
Cluster 2 þ Cluster 3 15.1402 0.8124
Notes: The null hypothesis of convergence is rejected at 5% if tb < 1, 65:
Source: Own estimates.
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curve was close to the average of the sample and could be included in the second
convergence group. After 2010, the trajectory is rising, which implies a divergence in
interest rates in other countries. A similar trend can also be observed in Portugal, but
the rising dynamics are much slower compared to Greece. In Ireland, up to 2013, the
interest rate trajectory was below the sample average. After 2013, the slope becomes
strongly ascendant. In the case of Bulgaria and Poland, we can observe a relatively
similar trend of evolution. Contrariwise, in the case of Romania the trajectory slope
is descending but not as pronounced, as in Hungary, for example. The equilibrium
point for the second convergence club is formed around the average of the sample.
Most of the countries included in this cluster have a steady slope for the interest rate.
This implies a high degree of predictability. The only exception is Hungary. Thus, if
at the beginning of the period analysed, Hungary was very close to Romania, starting
with 2012 the slope becomes strongly descending, approaching the average of the
sample at the end of the interval. The average of the sample is best reflected in the
behaviour of the interest rate in Germany. The last convergence cluster is formed
below the average of the sample. For the three countries in this group, we can say
that the adjustment process was the most powerful, with the countries in this group
being the most advantaged. At the end of the period of the paper, we can see that the
dispersion between the trajectories of the countries in the sample is higher, compared
to the beginning of the period, which means a lowering of the integration level. At
the beginning of the period, with the exception of five Central and Eastern European
Figure 1. Dynamics of interest rate trajectories on loans to the non-financial sector.
Source. Own estimates
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countries, all countries could form a convergence group around the average of
the sample.
Table 3 presents the results of the convergence algorithm for banking systems in
the 24 EU Member States, with the interest rate on mortgages granted to households
for the purchase of real estate as a benchmark. The convergence hypothesis for all
the countries included in the sample is rejected (tb ¼ 53.8206). Consequently, the
convergence algorithm identifies eight clusters of convergence and three divergent
countries. The first cluster of convergence includes Bulgaria, Hungary and the
Netherlands. The inclusion of the Netherlands in this convergence group, above the
average of the sample, is quite surprising. However, this is explicable if we take into
account the fact that the standard deviation of the interest rate on loans to house-
holds for the purchase of real estate is one of the lowest, and the value of the interest
rate in the lower range is one of the highest (Table 1). The second cluster of conver-
gence also has a heterogeneous structure. It includes: Poland, Romania, Germany, the
Czech Republic and Ireland. Actually, given the geographical criterion and the stage
of development criterion, heterogeneity is also the case for cluster 3, comprising
Slovakia and France, cluster 4 consisting of Greece and Belgium, cluster 5 consisting
of Denmark, Slovenia and Italy and cluster 6 consisting of Latvia and Luxembourg. A
higher level of homogeneity can be seen in cluster 7, consisting of Austria and
Sweden, and cluster 8, consisting of Estonia and Lithuania. The speed of convergence,
b̂, for all eight clusters is very low, which implies only relative convergence. Three
countries, Spain, Finland and Portugal, evince divergent behaviour. Consequently,
they are not included in any convergence cluster. Four pairs of clusters (2 and 3, 3
and 4, 5 and 6, 6 and 7) can form convergence clusters. The high number of conver-
gence clusters, the low convergence rate and the composition of clusters indicate high
disparities in the credit market for housing acquisition.
The heterogeneity of the interest rate applied to loans to the non-financial sector
reflects the differing characteristics of companies in the European Union (for
example, bankruptcy risk, profitability, solvency). In our view, in the long run, the
lack of integration will diminish the ability of companies in high-interest countries to
compete in a single market with common rules.
The high degree of heterogeneity can also be seen from the trajectory dynamics
highlighted in Figure 2. Moreover, the dispersion between interest rate curves has
increased over time, so that, at the end of the analysis period, we see the highest dif-
ference between countries above the average and countries below the sample average.
The equilibrium point for the first convergence cluster is well above the average of
the sample. The inclusion of the Netherlands, along with Bulgaria and Hungary, in
this first cluster is determined by the strong upward slope. The second convergence
group is formed slightly above the average of the sample. The significant downward
dynamics of Romania’s trajectory, especially after 2012, are noteworthy. In our opin-
ion, this development was driven by the government guarantee program, which
involved a reduction and capping of interest rates. The equilibrium point for the
third and fourth convergence groups tends towards the average of the sample. The
dynamics of the trajectory for Greece is quite surprising. Thus, unlike the interest
rate on loans to the non-financial sector, in this case we can see a high degree of
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Table 3. Cluster convergence algorithm for interest rate on mortgage loans granted to house-
holds for the purchase of buildings, 2007:1–2017:10.
Cluster Countries tb b̂
Cluster1 Bulgaria, Hungary, the Netherlands 7.5032 0.1191
Cluster2 Poland, Romania, Germany, Czech Republic, Ireland 13.5577 0.7064
Cluster3 Slovakia, France 2.4237 1.1396
Cluster4 Greece, Belgium 1.3154 1.4470
Cluster5 Denmark, Slovenia, Italy 11.4148 0.3528
Cluster6 Latvia, Luxembourg 6.4387 0.7866
Cluster7 Austria Sweden 1.1012 1.6076
Cluster8 Estonia, Lithuania 2.5786 1.7078
divergent Spain, Finland, Portugal
Testing the hypothesis of convergence between clusters
Cluster 1 þ Cluster 2 7.6213 0.2567
Cluster 2 þ Cluster 3 4.0819 0.4964
Cluster 3 þ Cluster 4 1.7945 0.7333
Cluster 4 þ Cluster 5 65.1556 1.0118
Cluster 5 þ Cluster 6 4.3642 0.0827
Cluster 6 þ Cluster 7 5.0203 0.1944
Cluster 8 þ Cluster 9 17.4674 1.3406
Notes: The null hypothesis of convergence is rejected at 5% if tb < 1, 65:
Source: Own estimates.
Figure 2. Dynamics of interest rates trajectories for mortgage loans granted to households for the
purchase of real estate.
Source: Own estimates
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stability. The last four convergence clusters are formed below the sample average.
The three divergent countries, Spain, Finland and Portugal, evince a strong down-
ward trend in interest rates trajectories. In fact, the three countries could form a con-
vergence cluster with an equilibrium point far below the average of the sample. The
evolution of interest rates in Spain and Portugal is counterintuitive. Although both
countries have been affected by the public debt crisis, having received financial assist-
ance packages, and the banking system in Spain has faced a high degree of instability,
interest rates in these countries are on a downward trend compared to other coun-
tries, which implies positive effects on the households of the population.
In our opinion, the high segmentation of interest rates on loans to households for
the purchase of real estate is determined by the particularities of the residential real
estate market in each country, by the way in which long-term bank resources are
financed, as well as by the public support programs for the residential market and by
the country-specific taxation system.
Table 4 presents the results of the convergence algorithm for banking systems in
the 24 EU Member States, using the interest rate on mortgages granted to households
for the purchase of real estate as a benchmark. The hypothesis of convergence for all
the countries included in the sample is rejected (tb ¼ 357.30).
Under these circumstances, the methodology proposed by Phillips and Sul (2007)
identifies five clusters of convergence and four divergent countries. The first conver-
gence group includes four Central and Eastern European countries: Latvia, the
Czech Republic, Estonia and Romania. The convergence rate is low (b̂ ¼ 0, 2206),
indicating only relative convergence. From the point of view of the economic devel-
opment criterion and the geographical criterion, the composition of the second
group is heterogeneous. It includes five Central and Eastern European countries
and three peripheral countries of the euro area. The same observation applies to the
fourth cluster, which includes Slovenia and Italy. It is worth noting that the second
and third clusters form a common convergence group. The fourth and fifth clusters
include countries in the hard core of the euro area. Convergence speed (b̂ < 2, 00)
indicates only relative convergence, which can be easily reversed. Four of the coun-
tries included in the sample, Finland, Portugal, Sweden and Denmark, do not con-
verge to any point of equilibrium. Testing the hypothesis of convergence among
clusters indicates that two pairs of clusters (1 and 2; 2 and 3) form unitary conver-
gence groups.
Figure 3 describes the dynamics of interest rate trajectories on consumer credit to
households. The first convergence group is formed well above the average of the sam-
ple. However, we should emphasize that the four countries included in this group
have different trajectories. Thus, while for Latvia and Estonia we see strong ascendant
slopes, especially for Latvia, for Romania and the Czech Republic, the trajectory curve
is more stable. Similarly, the equilibrium point for the second convergence group is
formed above the sample average. There is also heterogeneity of interest rate trajecto-
ries for this cluster.
Thus, for Hungary and Poland, the trajectories have a strong downward slope, for
Bulgaria and Slovenia, the trajectories are relatively stable, while for Spain, Lithuania,
Greece and Ireland the trajectories have a strong ascendant slope. If we carefully
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analyse the trajectory for Portugal, we can see that this country can be included in
the second convergence cluster.
The trajectory curve for Denmark is stable, reflecting the average of the sample.
Slovenia and Italy form a convergence group below the average of the sample.
Surprisingly, despite the fact that the banking system in Slovenia has been signifi-
cantly affected by the crisis and Italy has been affected by the tensions generated by
rising public debt financing, their interest rate trajectories are stable and have a slow
downward trend. The equilibrium point for the fourth convergence group is below
the sample average and includes Germany, the Netherlands and France, countries
which belong to the hard core of the euro area. Our previous observations also apply
in the case of the last convergence group, but we can see that the trajectories have a
much stronger downward trend. Given the trajectory of Finland, we can include it in
this last convergence cluster.
Table 5 presents the results of the convergence algorithm for banking systems in
the 24 EU Member States, using as benchmark the interest rate for term deposits
attracted from the non-financial sector. The convergence hypothesis for all the coun-
tries included in the sample is rejected (tb ¼ 2.2705). Consequently, the convergence
algorithm identifies three equilibrium points for the 24 countries. The first conver-
gence cluster includes eight countries, both from Central and Eastern Europe and
from Western Europe. The convergence rate for this cluster is low, reflecting only
relative convergence. The second convergence group comprises seven countries. Here
too, CEE, euro area hard core and euro area periphery countries are included. This is
also true for the third cluster of convergence. The convergence speed for the second
and third group (b̂ < 2, 00) indicates only relative convergence. Testing the hypoth-
esis of convergence among clusters reveals that the first and second clusters can form
a unitary group with a common equilibrium point.
Figure 4 illustrates the dynamics of interest rate trajectories on term deposits
attracted from the non-financial sector. On the whole, we can see that the trajectories
for the 24 countries are very different. The trajectories also have many inflection
points. The equilibrium point for the first convergence group is formed above the
sample mean. Besides the heterogeneity of the countries that are included in this con-
vergence group, we can see that there is also a high disparity in the dynamics of the
Table 4. Cluster convergence algorithm for interest rate on consumer credit to households,
2007:1–2017:10.
Cluster Countries tb b̂
Cluster1 Latvia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Romania 2.5260 0,2206
Cluster2 Spain, Ireland, Lithuania, Slovakia, Hungary, Greece, Bulgaria, Poland 11.2609 0.8286
Cluster3 Slovenia, Italy 172.469 1.8115
Cluster4 Germany, the Netherlands, France 24.9514 1.1223
Cluster5 Belgium, Austria, Luxemburg 59.0443 0.0268
divergent Finland, Portugal, Sweden, Denmark
Testing the hypothesis of convergence between clusters
Cluster 1 þ Cluster 2 1.1499 0.0590
Cluster 2 þ Cluster 3 4.1347 0.3435
Cluster 3 þ Cluster 4 4.6544 0.7561
Cluster 4 þ Cluster 5 17.3554 0.4180
Notes: The null hypothesis of convergence is rejected at 5% if tb < 1:65:
Source: Own estimates.
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trajectories. Thus, relative to the sample average, the trajectories have a strong down-
ward trend for Romania, Hungary and Bulgaria, but an upward trend for Belgium,
France, the Netherlands and Italy. In our view, these differences are determined by
the initial levels of interest rates in the countries included in this convergence group.
In Romania, Hungary and Bulgaria, the interest rates on term deposits were high.
Consequently, the adjustment of interest rates to lower values was made very fast, as
compared to the average of the sample. In fact, the three countries start out at the
beginning of the analysis period from the highest values and end up reaching values
below the sample average at the end of the study period. These observations also
hold for the second and third convergence groups. For example, with regard to the
second convergence group, for Greece and Portugal, the trajectory trend is strongly
downward, whereas in the case of Germany, Finland and the Czech Republic the tra-
jectory is ascending. With regard to the third convergence group, the trajectories
have a downward trend for Sweden, Slovenia and Ireland and an upward trend for
Austria, Denmark or Estonia. In the case of other countries – Luxembourg, Latvia or
Lithuania - there is a U-shaped trend, with the lowest point reached in 2013. In fact,
for most countries there is an inflection point in the period 2011–2013, which has
resulted in slower or more accelerated adjustments.
Table 6 presents the results of the convergence algorithm for banking systems in
the 24 EU Member States, using asa benchmark the interest rate for term deposits
attracted from the non-financial sector.
Figure 3. Dynamics of interest rate trajectories on consumer credit granted to households.
Source: Own estimates
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The convergence hypothesis for all the countries included in the sample is rejected
(tb ¼ 9.68481). As a consequence, the convergence algorithm identifies three equi-
librium points. The first cluster of convergence is made up of two countries in the
hard core of the euro area, the Netherlands and France. The second convergence
group has a mixed structure, including CEE countries, hard core of the euro area
countries and periphery of the euro area countries. Testing the convergence hypoth-
esis between the first two clusters reveals that they can form a homogeneous conver-
gence group. The last convergence group is consistent and comprises 16 countries.
The composition of the group is again heterogeneous. It is also noteworthy that the
convergence speed for the three clusters is low (b̂ < 2, 00), indicating only relative
convergence.
Figure 5 shows the interest rate trajectories for the term deposits attracted
from households.
In this case also, we find disparities in the trend of trajectories. By comparing
Figures 4 and 5 we can see similarities in the dynamics of interest rates in some
countries - Bulgaria, Romania and Hungary – for example.
At a more in-depth look, we find that the equilibrium point for the first conver-
gence group is well above the sample’s average, which implies a slower interest rate
adjustment process. The trajectories for the two countries included in the first cluster
are very similar. They start out, at the beginning of the analysis period, from an aver-
age point of the sample and follow an upward trend throughout the analysis period.
We notice that, after 2012, the upward trend is accelerating. The second convergence
cluster tends to a point of equilibrium above the average of the sample. However, on
closer look, we observe that the trajectories of the countries included in this group
are different. Thus, while Romania and Bulgaria have a downward trend, Belgium,
Germany, Italy and Slovakia have an upward trend. Practically, the trajectories of the
two groups of countries have a mirror-like evolution. Considering the initial interest
rates of the two groups (higher in Bulgaria and Romania, lower in Belgium,
Germany, Italy), the faster adjustment in the two CEE countries leads to their getting
closer to the values for the hard core countries. The third convergence group tends
to a point of equilibrium below the sample average. Within this group we can also
see differences in interest rate trajectories (for example, for Hungary, Greece, Spain
and Latvia, we see a downward trend, while for the Czech Republic we see an ascend-
ing trajectory). Many countries in this cluster have a U-shaped dynamics, with the
lowest point reached between 2011 and 2013 (Austria, Estonia, Luxembourg). In
Table 5. Cluster convergence algorithm for the interest rate on term deposits attracted from the
non-financial sector, 2007: 1–2017: 10.
Cluster Countries tb b̂
Cluster1 Belgium, Romania, Hungary, Bulgaria, Poland, France, the Netherlands, Italy 9.1575 0.6716
Cluster2 Germany, Slovakia, Greece, Spain, Finland, Czech Republic, Portugal 9.9556 0.3774
Cluster3 Austria, Estonia, Ireland, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Slovenia, Sweden, Denmark, Latvia 1.1240 0.2059
Testing the hypothesis of convergence between clusters
Cluster 1 þ Cluster 2 8.2722 0.3684
Cluster 2 þ Cluster 3 2.6891 0.2916
Notes: The null hypothesis of convergence is rejected at 5% if tb < 1, 65:
Source: Own estimates.
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most cases there is a point of inflection in 2012, from which a more pronounced evo-
lution begins. In our opinion, the sovereign debt crisis is the determinant factor for
this evolution.
The results obtained by testing the convergence hypothesis in the banking systems
in the European Union indicate a segmentation of the active and passive interest
rates. Although the model has revealed the convergence of banking systems across
multiple clusters, they still present a high level of heterogeneity. There are other
important aspects further revealed through these results. First, we can see there are
differences in how banks assess the non-financial sector and the households sector.
Second, the composition of the clusters is different from case to case. Third, from
2011 to 2013, a period coinciding with the most severe episodes of the sovereign debt
crisis, the dispersion between trajectories increases, implying a segmentation of
Figure 4. Dynamics of interest rate trajectories on term deposits attracted from the non-finan-
cial sector.
Source: Own estimates
Table 6. Cluster convergence algorithm for interest rate on term deposits attracted from house-
holds, 2007:1–2017:10.
Cluster Countries tb b̂
Cluster 1 Netherlands, France 4.9910 0.3338
Cluster 2 Romania, Bulgaria, Belgium, Poland, Italy,
Germany, Slovakia
120.503 1.0748
Cluster 3 Austria, Estonia, Spain, Finland, Greece, Ireland, Lithuania,
Luxembourg, Portugal, Slovenia, Czech Republic,
Hungary, Sweden, Denmark, Latvia
0.4044 0.0396
Testing the hypothesis of convergence among clusters
Cluster 1 þ Cluster 2 0.3615 0.0643
Cluster 2 þ Cluster 3 8.5625 0.2257
Notes: The null hypothesis of convergence is rejected at 5% if tb < 1, 65:
Source: Own estimates.
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interest rates. Hence, we can say that the integration of banking systems has been
negatively influenced by the sovereign debt crisis. It should be noted that there are
differences in how instability influenced interest rates. Thus, medium and short-term
interest rates were more affected, as compared to long-term interest rates. For
example, in the case of short-term interest rates financial tensions are more visible.
Finally, for most clusters the convergence speed is relative, which does not lead to an
absolute integration in the long run. In our opinion, given both the low convergence
speed and the dynamics of interest rate trajectories, the composition of the clusters
reflects a short-term picture valid at the end of the analysis period. Furthermore, rela-
tive convergence can also be quickly reversed.
Considering the above, as well as the hypotheses formulated at the beginning of
this paper, we can state that hypothesis H1 is rejected, and hypothesis H2 is accepted.
The empirical results indicate the rejection of the convergence hypothesis for selected
EU banking systems. Although the model has revealed the convergence of banking sys-
tems in the case of certain clusters, there is still a high level of heterogeneity.
4. Conclusions
The segmentation of interest rates and, implicitly, the lack of integration in the
European Union are determined by several factors. First, the credit risk associated
with the non-financial sector and households in the EU member countries is differ-
ent. In addition, the residential and non-financial sector in the EU Member States
have endogenous characteristics which determine interest rate asymmetries. Second,
there is a high degree of heterogeneity in macroeconomic and financial stability (e.g.
disparities in sovereign risk, public and private indebtedness) in the case of EU
Member State, which is reflected in a different country risk. Third, the banks in the
Figure 5. Dynamics of interest rate trajectories on term deposits attracted from households.
Source: Own estimates
ECONOMIC RESEARCH-EKONOMSKA ISTRAŽIVANJA 417
EU Member States operate based on regulatory and supervisory frameworks which
are specific to each country. Fourthly, as far as organizational arrangements are con-
cerned, the banking systems in the selected countries are rather different.
The lack of integration of banking systems in the European Union is a serious
impediment to the convergence of the Member States. Interest rate divergence leads
to disparities regarding assess borrowing costs for non-financial corporations and
households, and also generates segmentation effect on real interest rates. These factors
lead to diminishing the competitiveness of companies, increasing the indebtedness of
companies and households and, ultimately, increasing economic, social and financial
disparities between developed and developing countries. Under these circumstances,
increasing integration in EU banking systems is imperative. An increased integration
will lead to reduced contagion effects and to cost sharing, as well as to similar costs
for companies and the population, which, in fact, operate in a single market with
common rules.
We believe our findings will be useful for public authorities, decision-makers in
credit institutions, managers and investors alike. Integrating banking systems in the
EU should be the main concern of EU public authorities. This can be achieved
through a process of legislative convergence, by strengthening and consolidating the
EU’s banking union, by assuming a risk-sharing mechanism and a tax trans-
fer mechanism.
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